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NOTES
Program Environmental Impact Statements: Review and
Remedies
"[R]ecognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment,"1 the Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA). 2 This Act declared that it was the policy of the federal
government "to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans."3 To carry out this environmental policy, NEPA directed all federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement on the
environmental effects of all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. " 4 Early litigation focused only on whether particular individual actions were within the
scope of NEPA5 and thereby required so-called site-specific state1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(l)
(Supp. 1976).
3. NEPA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
4. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). Section 4332 provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1)
the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
· environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public • • • .
S. See, e.g., Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693
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ments. More recent cases, however, have determined that NEPA
also applies to broad federal programs that encompass a number of
individual component projects, 6 although the full extent of that application remains unclear.
This Note discusses the application of NEPA to federal programs. It first analyzes when the ~ourts have required a program
impact statement and draws upon that analysis to explain the relative
functions of site-specific and program statements. It then examines
the appropriate scope of- judicial inquiry and the proper standards
for reviewing federal program compliance with NEPA. Finally, the
Note scrutinizes the types of remedies that may be imposed if a program does not comply with NEPA and proposes a procedure for determining the proper scope of judicial remedies.

l.

REQUIREMENT FOR A PROGRAM STATEMENT

An important early decision holding that the requirement of a
detailed impact statement applied to federal programs was Scientists'
Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 7
which involved an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) research program to develop a liquid metal fast-breeder-reactor. 8 The AEC
had conceded that impact statements were required for each of the
major test facilities and demonstration plants planned for the breeder
reactor program. 9 The critical issue, however, was whether at some
point "the Commission must issue a statement for the research and
development program as a whole, rather than simply for individual
facilities . . . .mo The court, declaring that the "Commission [had
taken] an unnecessarily crabbed approach to NEPA" in assuming
(2d Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Citizens Organized
to Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
For a discussion of early NEPA litigation, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN nm
CoURTS ( 1973).
6. See, e.g., Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Scientists' Institute
for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
7. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
8. A fast-breeder-reactor transforms a nonfissionable material into a different, fissionable substance that can fuel an atomic reactor. "It is estimated that after about
10 years of operation the typical fast-breeder-reactor will produce enough fissionable
Plutonium-239 not only to refuel itself completely, but also to fuel an additional reactor of comparable size." 481 F.2d at 1083. Development of a fast-breeder-reactor
was expected to overcome the limitations placed on the use of atomic energy by the
scarcity of naturally suitable atomic fuel. 481 F.2d at 1083. For a pessimistic opinion on the prospects for development of a feasible fast-breeder-reactor, see A Look
at the Present Status of the Breeder Reactor Program: Power "Too Cheap to Meter''
Revisited, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 50202 (1975).
9. 481 F.2d at 1085.
10. 481 F.2d at 1085. For a discussion of the court's view in Scientists' Institute
as to when a program statement should be prepared, see note 22 infra,
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that NEPA requirements do not extend to programs, 11 held that the
program was an action significantly affecting the quality of the environment within the meaning of NEPA12 and that an impact statement was thus required not only for each individual facility but also
for the entire development program.
To support its decision, -the Scientists' Institute court cited a
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 13 memorandum on the
application of impact statements:
Individual actions that are related either geographically or as logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions may be more appropriately evaluated in a single program statement. Such a statement
also appears appropriate in connection with . . . the development of
a new program that contemplates a number of subsequent actions .
. . . [T]he program statement has a number of advantages. It
provides an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effects
and alternatives than would be practicable in a statement on an individual action. It ensures consideration of cumulative impacts that
might be slighted in a case-by-case analysis. And it avoids duplicative reconsideration of basic policy questions . . . .14
Thus, an essential reason for requiring program impact statements
is that some activities are so interrelated that they will have cumulative or synergistic environmental effects. Where such interrelatedness exists, an environmental evaluation of one project will not be
adequate unless it takes into account the effects of the other projects.
The court then considered whether the breeder-reactor develop11. 481 F.2d at 1086.
12. 481 F.2d at 1088.
13. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established by title II
of NEPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4343,
4346a-b (Supp. 1976). The Council serves, in its primary function, as an advisor
to the President on environmental matters. Specifically, it assists the President
in preparing the Environmental Quality Report required by section 201 of NEPA,
42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1970), gathers information on the quality of the environment,
reviews the activities of the federal government in light of the national environmental policy articulated in title I of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-35 (1970), as
amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I) (Supp. 1976), and recommends policies
to the President to promote the improvement of environmental quality. NEPA
§ 204, 42 u.s.c. § 4344(2)-(4) (1970).
As to the influence that Council recommendations should have, one court has said
that "[a]lthough the Guidelines are merely advisory and the Council on Environmental Quality has no authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with
NEPA, we would not lightly suggest that the Council, entrusted with the responsibility of developing and recommending national policies 'to foster and promote the improvement of the environmental quality' . . . has misconstrued NEPA." Greene
County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commn., 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972),
quoting NEPA § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970); see Carolina Action v. Simon, 389
F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
14. 481 F.2d at 1087-88 (deletions original), quoting CEQ, Memorandum to Federal Agencies on Procedures for Improving Environmental Impact Statements (May
16, 1972) [hereinafter CEQ Memorandum], reprinted in 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.
82-87 (1972).
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ment activities were a group of closely related projects for which a
comprehensive program statement was required. In deciding that
these projects ought to be evaluated as a unit, the court placed great
weight on the irreversible commitment that would result from taking
the first step in the program. Because of the massive investments
necessary to develop new energy technology, developing a workable
breeder reactor will necessarily mean that some alternative methods
of energy production will not be explored.15 When in the future
new forms of energy must be employed, the only technologies available will be those developed today. 16 Therefore, by engaging in the
development of breeder reactors now, the government may very well
be committing itself to using the breeder reactor in the future. 17
Any impact statement that did not take into consideration the effects
of relying solely on breeder reactors for energy in the future would
thus fail to discuss one of the most significant environmental impacts
of the research and development program.
Other cases considering the need for a program statement for
-arguably interrelated projects have also employed the irretrievable
commitment of resources analysis. 18 In these cases, taking the first
step would not have precluded future options to the same extent as
would embarking on the development of a breeder reactor; however,
making an initial commitment could serve to shift the balance of environmental costs and economic benefits in favor of completing the
program. For example, in cases involving highway construction,
courts have held that in considering the environmental effects, the
government cannot break a highway project into small segments as
if each segment had no relation to the completion of the entire highway.19 Even though a segment may be justifiable when considered
in isolation, the construction of that segment may make any alternative to the entire highway relatively more expensive. Moreover, the
increased traffic that may result from the completion of one segment
15. See generally Application of NEPA to Long-Range Technology Development
Programs: SIPI v. AEC, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10099, 10099 (1973): "Research in the area has been encouraged within the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] for over 20 years, with Congress recently appropriating an average of $100 million per year for the program. Future outlays will bring the total to about $2 billion
by 1980, as much as that spent federally for the development of all other energy
sources combined."
16. 481 F.2d at 1090.
17. 481 F.2d at 1089 n.43.
18. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974).
19. See Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F.
Supp. 282, 287 (D.N.H. 1974); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11, 18
(8th Cir. 1973).
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generates additional public and institutional pressures to complete
the remaining segments. 20
Thus, the crucial element in the irretrievable commitment test
for determining the need for a program impact statement is whether
the taking of a particular action now will so alter the balance of environmental cost and economic benefit as to preclude a meaningful
decision on the program in the future. 21 It is often true that as the
government invests more in a program, the loss that would be caused
by abandonment increases and the gross benefits that can be derived
from completing the program are measured against a decreased cost
to complete. In such a case, the economic benefit derived from
completion of the last few segments includes the increased benefit
that would result from the use of the entire program; thus, for the
particular highway segment in question, the economic benefits steadily gain weight in comparison with the computed environmental cost,
which remains the same as the last few individual segments are completed. Eventually, once a particular initial action has been taken
in many government programs, the economic benefit to be achieved
by completion becomes sufficiently great relative to the environmental and economic costs of completion to make a decision to abandon
the program highly unlikely. 22
20. See Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F.
Supp. 282, 285-86 (D.N.H. 1974).
Under similar reasoning, the court in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974), granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs who charged that the environmental impact statement prepared for the renovation and enlargement of a lock on the Mississippi River was inadequate because it
did not discuss the environmental effects of enlarging all the locks on the waterway.
The court, in determining that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail in proving that
the single lock enlargement represented the beginning of a system-wide improvement
program, relied on the draft version of the environmental impact statement. The
statement conceded that for the proposed enlarged lock to operate at full capacity,
a substantially increased amount of traffic and larger vessels had to be allowed to
reach iL Thus, the Corps of Engineers would be under constant pressure from those
navigating the river to make the fullest possible use of the enlarged lock by enlarging
the other locks on the river. 382 F. Supp. at 618-19.
21. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Commn., 481 F.2d 1079, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (''To wait until a technology attains
the stage of commercial feasibility before considering the possible adverse environmental effects attendant upon ultimate application of the technology will undoubtedly
frustrate meaningful consideration and balancing of environmental costs against economic and other benefits").
22. See Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power v. United States Atomic Energy
Commn., 463 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (each increment of government investment "tilts the balance away from the side of environmental concerns").
Having discussed the primary significance of Scientists' Institute-the germination
of the irretrievable commitment test-it is now appropriate to note the second issue
presented in the case: Assuming that a program impact statement is required in a
particular instance, when should it be prepared? The court recognized that "[s]tatements must be written late enough in the development process to contain meaningful
information, but they must be written early enough so that what information is contained can practically serve as an imput in the decision-making process." 481 F.2d
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This shift away from environmental concerns is reinforced by the
creation of institutional pressures to complete a program once it has
begun. The prime concern of an agency charged with missions
such as road or dam building is the completion of the program even
at the expense of the environment. 23 The effects of this missionorientation are heightened not only by institutional inertia but also
by a reluctance of administrators to admit that the program, on which
large expenditures have been made, would never have been undertaken had a comprehensive environmental assessment been made at
the outset. Thus, if an agency is allowed to begin segments of the
program without first preparing a comprehensive impact statement,
a bias will be added to the problems already present in attempting
to make a fair assessment of environmental factors, a bias that is difficult to identify and correct.
A separate line of cases has sought to determine whether a project was a part of a program for which an impact statement should
be required by ascertaining whether that specific project had significance independent of other alleged program elements. 24 A project has
such significance if it can function alone and if no further actions
need be taken to derive benefit from it. 25 If a project has an "independent significance," it has been held that no program statement
is required. 26
One example of the "independent significance" analysis is Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 21 in which the court sought to determine
whether an impact statement prepared for the first phase of the twoat 1094. In the context of fast-breeder-reactor development, the court suggested four
factors to consider in determining the time for preparation: the likelihood that tho
technology will prove commercially feasible and the imminence of its doing so, the
availability of meaningful information as to the effects of applying both the technology and its alternatives, the creation of irretrievable commitments and the preclusion of options as the development program progresses, and, finally, the severity of
environmental effects if the technology does prove commercially feasible. 481 F.2d
at 1094. See CEQ Guidelines on the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(d)(2) (1976). This balancing standard is definitely in•
applicable unless at least one action or project of a contemplated program actually
has been proposed by the relevant federal agency. See note 53 infra & text at notes
51-55 infra. In fact, it may have been eliminated altogether, with impact statements
now necessary only after a particular project or an entire program has been proposed.
See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2728, 2730 n.20 (1976).
23. See Note, Substantive Review Under the National Environmental Policy
Acts: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 EcoLOGY L.Q. 173, 197-99 (1973).
24. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club
v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974). For further discussion of the "independent significance" approach, see Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact
Statements Under the National Environmental Policy Act: A Definitional Approach,
23 UCLA L. REV. 124 (1975).
25. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th·Cir. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788, 792-93 (10th Cir. 1974).
26. See cases cited note 25 supra.
27. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
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phase Teton Dam and Reservoir Project need also consider the environmental effects of the second phase. The first phase included the
construction of a dam and an electrical generating station and the
improvement of the local irrigation system. The second phase was
to provide for the disposition, primarily for irrigation, of the one
half of the reservoir capacity that was not disposed of by phase one.
The court observed that the immediate benefits of flood control, irrigation, and hydroelectric power would result from the first phase
whether or not phase two was ever carried out. 28 Thus, the court
ruled that the impact statement need not consider the effects of
phase two because phase one was substantially independent of the
second project. 29
•
To a certain extent, the independent significance test of Trout
Unlimited and the irreversible commitment test of Scientists' Institute can be seen as opposite sides of the same coin. 30 The Scientists'
Institute court required a program statement when the first step compelled the agency to take subsequent actions; 31 the Trout Unlimited
cour.t said an overall statement was not needed when future actions
were not made necessary by the project in question. 32 The cases
that require a program statement discuss the irreversible commitment involved88 and the cases that find a program statement to be
unnecessary direct their analysis toward the finding of independent
significance. 34
It would be incorrect to conclude that the result is always determined by the choice of analysis. Indeed, in many situations the result would be the same regardless of which test were applied. Still,
28. 509 F.2d at 1285 n.13.
29. 509 F.2d at 1285. Furthermore, because the second phase would not be put
into effect until the Secretary of the Interior submitted a finding of feasibility to the
Congress and the President, the court concluded that Congress intended the two
phases of the program to be considered separately. 509 F.2d at 1284-85.
30. The court in Trout Unlimited, observing that in Scientists' Institute the fastbreeder-reactor research and development program had no independent significance
absent future application of the technology developed, see text at notes 7-17 supra,
specifically pointed out that its analysis was not inconsistent with that of the court
in Scientists' Institute. The court pointed out that no benefits would result from the
mere development of fast-breeder-reactor technology; benefits would only result if the
technology were put into use. In contrast, inimediate benefits would flow from the
first phase of the Teton Dam and Reservoir project even if phase two were never
put into effect 509 F.2d at 1285 n.13.
31. 481 F.2d at 1089-90; see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway,
382 F. Supp. 610, 620-22 (D.D.C. 1974).
32. 509 F.2d at 1285; see Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788, 792-93 (10th Cir.
1974).
33. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Commn., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974).
34. See Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974).
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there have been cases, for example Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Ry. v. Callaway, 35 in which the result has depended on the test. In
that case, the Army Corps of Engineers planned to rebuild and enlarge
one of a series of locks on the Mississippi River. When the Scientists'
Institute test of irreversible commitment is applied, a program statement on the related network of locks and dams is properly called
for. 36 First, use of the increased capacity of the one lock would necessitate the modification or rebuilding ·of other dams and locks. 37 If
the environmental impacts of each lock were considered separately,
the economic benefits to be gained through the additional use of
completed locks would then be balanced against the environmental
loss caused by the construction of only the lock under consideration.
This results because the completi9n of each new lock contributes to
the derivation of benefits from all other locks while only the environmental damage caused by the construction of the individual lock
being proposed would be considered. 38 In such a situation it is unlikely that an agency would determine the environmental costs to
outweigh the economic benefits.
Moreover, by focusing on the environmental impact of only individual locks within the system, the Corps precludes a meaningful consideration of alternatives to expanding the complete waterway system. As each lock is constructed the remaining cost of completion
in both economic and environmental terms for the whole program
is reduced. Consequently, when the waterway system is then compared to such alternative transportation systems as a railway, the relative economic and environmental costs will be shifted in favor of
completing the partially constructed network. A comprehensive
evaluation of the environmental impact of the entire lock and dam
program conducted before the commencement of individual projects
may result in the selection of an alternative that will cause less environmental damage.
However, when the independent significance test is applied to
the plan to enlarge an individual lock, a contrary result is obtained.
Even though full use of the expanded lock would not occur unless
all the locks were enlarged, substantial benefit would result from remodelling only the one lock, i.e., the existing river traffic could use
35. 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974).
36. The court in Atchison did rely on the irreversible commitment test set forth
in Scientists' Institute, and decided that a program statement was necessary. The decision was based on the finding that there was a comprehensive plan to enlarge the
Mississippi river lock and dam system. See 382 F. Supp. at 620-22; note 20 supra.
37. 382 F. Supp. at 622; see note 20 supra.
38. This assumes that all the environmental harm results from the construction
and the operating of the locks and not from the increased river traffic. If the increase in traffic had environmental effects, the degree to which construction of each
lock would increase traffic would have to be considered in each site-specific evaluation.
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a modern facility instead of the outmoded lock that it replaced. Because the rebuilt lock would have independent significance, the
Trout Unlimited test would not require a program statement.
In addition to yielding contradictory results in certain cases, the
irreversible commitment and independent significance tests will .not
require program statements in all cases in which one is desirable.
The CEQ memorandum, upon which -the Scientists' Institute court relied, stated that program statements may be required for a group
of "[i]ndividual actions that are related either geographically or as
logical parts in a chain of contemplated actions." 39 This language is neither limited to actions that will result in an irreversible
commitment nor excludes actions that have an independent significance. The memorandum states that one of the purposes of requiring a program statement is to evaulate cumulative effects of the program "that might be slighted .in a case-by-case analysis." 40 This purpose would not be served if the cumulative effects of independently
significant projects that were actually program components were not
considered in a program statement.
The dissent to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Sierra Club v. Morton41 provides one example of how neither the irreversible commitment nor the independent
significance test would require a program statement when environmental considerations of the type described in the CEQ memorandum
seem to warrant preparing such a statement. In this case involving the
development of the coal resources of the Northern Great Plains area,
the dissent would not have required a program impact statement because each coal mine had independent significance and because
granting a permit for one mine would not irreversibly commit the
government to approving another mine later. The dissent pointed
out that the agencies had required each individual impact statement
to consider the cumulative impacts of the related developments. 42
However, if the cumulative effects of all the projects are conceded to have an environmental .impact deserving of consideration,
it would seem more rational to consider the overall effects before,
not after, development is begun. If the cumulative effects are only
considered as each mine is proposed, it is possible that the environmentally worst operation, i.e., that which causes the most damage
to the environment, would be permitted if it were proposed early,
when the cumulative effects were at a low level, and that the envi39. See CEQ Memorandum.
40. See id.
41. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), revd., 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976). Judge MacKinnon wrote the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion. 514 F.2d at 884. For a discussion of the majority opinion, see text at notes 45-55 infra.
42. 514 F.2d at 886 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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ronmentally best project would not be allowed if proposed later,
when even a slight impact would bring the cumulative effect to an
intolerable level. Had a comprehensive environmental evaluation
been made before development on individual projects began, projects could have been selected to provide the greatest use of coal resources at the smallest environmental cost. 43
The approach of the majority in Sierra Club v. Morton would
have filled the gap left open by the independent significance and
irreversible commitment tests; it involved independent judicial examination of the actions of the Interior Department to determine
whether the government had, in fact, contemplated a program regardless of whether the agency declared the actions to constitute a
program. 44 However, in Kleppe v. Sierra Club 4 r; the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals. The Court concluded that NEPA required impact statements only for actions that are actually proposed
by the agency and not merely contemplated. 46 On the facts the
court determined that there was no proposed regional program; all
actions that had been proposed were either local or national in
scope47 and each had an impact statement that was not disputed. 46
Yet the Court did, at least, suggest an approach to defining the
need for program statements that is broader than either the independent significance or the irreversible commitment analyses. It
43. In Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975), the court implicitly recognized the inadequacy of the independent significance test. Cady involved a lease of
mineral rights in coal by the Crow Indians to a private company, which the Bureau
of Indian Affairs approved without preparing an environmental impact statement.
The lease covered 30,876.45 acres and ran for ten years and as long thereafter as
coal was produced in paying quantities. Thereafter, the company entered into contracts to supply 77,000,000 tons of coal over twenty years to four utility companies.
When the company applied for federal governmental approval of a mining plan covering operations for five years on 770 acres of the leased land, the BIA prepared an
impact statement for that plan. In holding that an impact statement was required
for the lease of all the land for coal mining, the court said that
- [w]hile it is true that each mining plan prepared for tracts within the lensed
area is to a significant degree an independent project which requires a separate
[impact statement] with respect to each, it is no less true that the breadth and
scope of the possible projects made possible by the Secretary's approval of the
leases require the type of comprehensive study that NEPA mandates adequately
to inform the Secretary of the possible environmental consequences of his approval. [The leasing company's] massive capital investment and extended contractual commitments present a situation in which "it would be irrational, or at
least unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also undertaken." . . . However, even were this not true, it cannot be denied that the
environmental consequences of several strip mining projects extending over twenty years or more within a tract of 30,876.45 acres will be significantly different
from those which will accompany [the leasing company's] activities on a single
tract of 770 acres.
527 F.2d at 795 (citation omitted).
44. 514 F.2d at 873.
45. 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976).
46. 96 S. Ct. at 2728-29.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 2725.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 2726.
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noted that, in general, "[c]umulative environmental impacts are, indeed, what require a comprehensive impact statement. " 49 The
Court also specifically identified "the extent of the interrelationship
among the proposed actions and the practical considerations of feasibility" as being among the relevant factors that must be considered. 50
There was no mention of any requirement that an irreversible commitment be present nor were actions that are independently significant excluded from being considered a part of a broader program
that would require an impact statement. This approach thus provides the basis for an analysis that will encompass a broader range
of action for which a program statement ought to be required and
in this regard is a doctrinal advance along the lines suggested by the
CEQ memorandum.
Despite the broad implications that Kleppe may have for the evolution of standards for ascertaining whether a progrm exists, the
holding of the Court on when an action requires an impact statement may significantly restrict the effectiveness of NEPA in forcing
agencies to consider pr9gram environmental impacts early in their
decision-making process. The Court, as noted above, rejected the
position of the court of appeals that an agency may be required to
begin preparing an impact statement prior to the recommendation
or report on a proposal for an action. 51 A court, then, has no role
in the process of considering environment impacts until a report or
recommendation on the proposal for an action is made. 52 This construction of NEPA requires that the program statements encompass
only those actions that have been proposed, not those that are merely
contemplated. 53 Unfortunately, the Kleppe majority offered no
49. 96 S. Ct at 2732.
50. 96 S. Ct. at 2731. In the context of projects geographically interrelated, the
Court said that it was the role of the responsible federal agency to determine whether
-a comprehensive regional statement is needed and, if so, to determine the appropriate
region. The agency determination will not be disturbed unless it is shown that the
agency acted arbitrarily. See 96 S. Ct at 2731.
51. 96 S. Ci. at 2728-29. The Court of Appeals had devised a balancing test involving four factors to determine when an agency must begin preparing a statement:
How likely is the program to come to fruition, and how soon will that occur?
To what extent is meaningful information presently available on the effects of
implementation of the program, and of alternatives and their effects? To what
extent are irretrievable commitments being made and options precluded as refinement of the proposal progresses? How severe will be the environmental effects if the program is implemented?
514 F.2d at 880. See note 22 supra.
52. 96 S. Ct. at 2729.
53. "The statute, however, speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not
require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent
actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions." 96 S. Ct. at 2730
n.20 (emphasis original). However, Kleppe should not mean that program statements are no longer necessary in cases such as Scientists' Institute, see text at notes
7-17 supra, in which early actions irreversibly commit the agency to an entire group
of actions. The point of the irreversible commitment analysis is that by proposing
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guidance for distinguishing "proposed" and "contemplated" actions.
As the dissent noted, both the statute and the legislative history shed
little light on this question. 54 It is therefore unclear to what extent
Kleppe will reduce the comprehensiveness of program statements.
There is no doubt, however, that the Court has adopted an approach
that will substantially limit timely judicial review of an agency's compliance with its obligations under NEPA to integrate the consideration of environmental effects into its decision-making process. 1m
Now that the basic requirement that an agency prepare program
impact statements has been established, it is appropriate to consider
the functions of a program statement. This discussion will make it
even more evident why courts should strictly enforce statement requirements for programs. First, it is necessary to review the policies of
NEPA that are fulfilled by both site-specific and program impact
statements. The relative roles of site-specific and program impact
statements in accomplishing specific purposes of NEPA will then be
analyzed.
According to the CEQ Guidelines, the purpose of requiring impact statements is to assist agencies in carrying out the environmental
protection policies of NEPA. 56 Specifically, section 102(2)(c) of
NEPA requires agencies to build into their decision-making processes a consideration of the environmental effects of their activities. 117
one action, an agency is in effect proposing the whole series of activities to which
the agency is irreversibly committed. If later actions inevitably follow from early
actions, it is meaningless to say that such later actions are only "contemplated." Cf.
96 S. Ct. at 2732 n.26.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2735 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
"A statute that imposes a complicated procedural requirement on all 'proposals' for
'major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment'
and then assiduously avoids giving any hint, either expressly or by way of legislative
history, of what is meant by a 'proposal' or by a 'major Federal action' can hardly
be termed precise."
55. The dissent stated that "this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve
as no more than a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of NEPA," 96 S. Ct.
at 2735, and, thus, that courts should be able to create mechanisms to enforce the
duties imposed by NEPA.
The dissent relied on two policies in support of requiring agencies to begin preparation of an impact statement before a proposal is made. First, because the preparation of an impact statement involves a significant amount of time, an agency must
begin preparation early enough to complete it by the time a decision on the project ·
must be made. 96 S. Ct. at 2734 ("because an early start in preparing an impact
statement is necessary if an agency is to comply with NEPA, there comes a time
when an agency that fails to begin preparation of a statement on a contemplated project is violating the law''). Second, the essential policy of NEPA, see text at notes
1-3 supra, requires consideration of the environmental effects of a project throughout
the entire planning and decision-making process. 96 S. Ct. at 2734.
56. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(a) (1976).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(a) (1976); see Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174 (6th Cir. 1972), application for stay denied, 414 U.S. 1036 (1973).
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The impact statement is intended to provide the decision-makers
with the information needed to consider the impact on the environment;58 it is not supposed to serve only as a post hoc rationalization
of decisons already made. 59 Furthermore, the impact statement is
intended to guide not only the agency but also the ultimate decisionmakers, Congress and the President. 60
A second major purpose of the impact statement is to alert interested parties to the environmental consequences of a proposed action. 61 These interested parties may suggest alternatives that will
reduce the environmental damage or may identify additional environmental costs of which the agency was not aware. 62 In this man58. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
59. Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
One writer, questioning the extent to which environmental factors are actually
considered as part of the decision-making process, concludes that NEPA bas resulted
in agency preparation of after-the-fact rationalizations that are designed not to influence the decision made, but rather to survive legal challenge. F. ANDERSON, supra
note 5, at 288. However, the writer concedes that the early NEPA cases bav~ laid
a groundwork for eventual improvement in federal decision-making. Id. at 288-93.
The Acting Director of Civil Works of the Army Corps of Engineers, Kenneth E.
McIntyre, bas testified that about one out of every three civil works projects bas been
modified as a result of agency efforts induced by NEPA. Hearings on Oversight of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to Assess Certain Federal Agencies'
Compliance Thereto and to Review Implementation Problems Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-14, at 3 (1975).
60. See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
61. See Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 511
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); Note, Judicial Review, Delegation, and Public Hearings Under NEPA, 1974 DUKE L.J. 423, 440.
62. Cf. Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 511
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
In order to comply with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1970), which requires that an agency solicit comments on its plans prior to preparing the environmental impact statement, agencies must prepare two impact statements
-a draft statement and a final statement. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1976). The
draft statement must circulate for review and comment to federal and federal-state
agencies that have jurisdiction by law, or have special expertise with respect to the
environmental effect involved, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9(a)(l) (1976), and to the public.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.9(d) (1976). Before preparing the final statement, which must
also be circulated for comment, comments received on the draft statement are to be
carefully evaluated and considered. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1976). Copies of substantive comments received on the draft statement are to be attached to the final
statement whether or not the agency decides to discuss the comments in the text
of the final statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l0(a) (1976). It should be emphasized
that only the final statement satisfies NEPA; a draft statement prepared without the
solicitation of comments does not fulfill the requirements of section 102(2) (C).
To inform the public of the availability of impact statements for comment, the
CEQ publishes monthly the 102 Monitor, which lists the impact statements filed with
the CEQ during the preceding month and tells who in the agency may be contacted
to provide information about the statement. The 102 Monitor should list all impact
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ner, the agency will gather more information to help it make an appropriate deicision.
Although these general comments about the purpose of impact
statements apply to both program and site-specific statements, the
two types of statements address different issues and serve different
functions. 63 Basically, the site-specific statement focuses upon the
environmental impact of one project. However, because the total
impact of a program is greater than the sum of the impacts of the
individual projects, a program statement should evaluate the cumulative environmental effects of all the projects. 64 Although each sitespecific statement may report the cumulative effects of the projects
thus far undertaken, such a procedure does not assist comprehensive
environmental planning, 65 one of the basic functions of the impact
statement, 66 because some of the actions would already have been
taken.
Another function of program statements is to settle broad questions of policy. 67 For example, general alternatives to the program
would be dealt with in the program statement and then need not
be reevaluated in every site-specific statement. 68 The site-specific
statements would then discuss alternatives only to particular projects,
such as alternative sites. 69
It might be argued that an agency may avoid preparing a program statement by discussing questions of policy and alternatives in
the site-specific statements. However, the cumulative effects of programs cannot be adequately considered in the planning stages without
a program evaluation. Therefore, discussing broad policy issues in
site-specific statements would not spare an agency the efforts of preparing a program statement. Considerations of efficiency would then
mandate a discussion of all matters pertaining to the program at one
time. There is no need to reconsider basic questions in every sitespecific statement. 70
statements prepared because section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires the agencies to file
a copy of their statements with the CEQ.
63. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Commn., 481 F.2d 1079, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Application of NEPA to LongRange Technology Development Programs: SIP/ v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10099,
10100.
64. CEQ, Memorandum; see Application of NEPA to Long-Range Technology
Development Programs: SIP/ v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10099.
65. See text at notes 41-43 supra.
66. See text at notes 56-60 supra.
67. See CEQ Memorandum. See generally Application of NEPA to Long-Range
Technology Development Programs: SIP/ v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10099.
68. See CEQ Memorandum. Of course, in a long-range program a change in underlying assumptions may warrant revision of the program statement.
69. See Comprehensive Planning Under NEPA: D.C. Circuit Widens Applicability of Program Impact Statements, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10118, 10122 (1975).
70. Cf. CEQ Memorandum.
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Although the Scientists' Institute court said that it was of "little
moment" whether the program analysis was issued separately or as
part of a statement for a p~ticular project, it recognized that the
program statement discusses different issues and addresses a different audience than does the site-specific statement. 71 The court expressed the opinion that it would make more sense to issue a separate program statement than to burden a site-specific statement with
the program analysis. 72 Later courts have required a separate program evaluation in addition to the evaluation for each individual
project. 73 Such a requirement for multiple impact statements has
been labelled by some commentators as "tiering."74 Each level or
tier deals with different issues, although each relies upon the findings
of the other tiers. 75

II.

JUDICIAL

REvmw

OF IMPACT STATEMENTS

Once an impact statement for a major federal action has been
prepared, two questions concerning judicial review inevitably arise:
First, what is the proper scope of judicial review of agency action,
and, second, what is the appropriate standard of review? Although
it is clear that agency compliance with NEPA is subject to judicial
review, 76 the courts do not agree on what obligations NEPA imposes
on the federal agencies and, consequently, they do not agree on the
extent of judicial review that is appropriate. To date, the cases that
have dealt with these questions have involved only single projects,
and it is thus on the basis of these cases that an initial delineation
71. 481 F.2d 1079, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
72. 481 F.2d at 1092-93.
73. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 795 (9th Cir. 1975); CEQ Memorandum.
74. See Comprehensive Planning Under NEPA: D.C. Circuit Widens Applicability of Program Impact Statements, supra note 69, at 10122; F. ANDERSON, supra
note 5, at 280 n.91.
75. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 290-91:
For instance, the alternative of flood-plain zoning could be exhaustively considered in an early comprehensive statement on the best way to manage a river basin; that alternative need not then be comprehensively reconsidered in statements
on particular projects if the decision is made to construct a series of dams or
river levees. The latter statements could focus on localized impacts, without the
agency's having failed to give the comprehensive early environmental review
called for by NEPA.
76. NEPA does not expressly provide for judicial review. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 13. However, the Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§
701-706 (1970), creates a presumption of reviewability of agency action. See, e.g.,
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 655 n.12 (10th Cir. 1971); Note,
The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88
HARV. L. REV. 735, 741 (1975). The presumption is conclusive unless judicial review
is precluded either by statute or because "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). Because NEPA contains no express
prohibition of judicial review and the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the
agency discretion exemption, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402,410 (1971), no court has denied reviewability.

122

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:107

of the principles of judicial review must be made. The application
of these principles to the review of program statements will then be
considered.
All courts have recognized that section 102 of ~PA77 imposes
certain procedural requirements on agency decision-making78 and
that these requirements are judicially enforceable. 79 Included in
these procedures is the requirement that for each major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the environment, the agency
must prepare a detailed statement. 80 This statement must describe
the environmental effect of the project, alternatives to tlle proposed
action, and any irretrievable commitment of resources that would result from the action.81
Although the requirement that agencies prepare impact statements has probably been the greatest source of NEPA litigation,
there are additional procedural requirements of section 102 that are
designed to insure that the agencies develop and use sound environmental planning methods. 82 The agencies are required to use the
social and natural sciences and the environmental design arts in an
interdisciplinary approach to planning;83 to develop methods- to give
appropriate consideration in decision-making to presently unquantified environmental factors; 84 and to develop alternatives to proposed
actions involving "unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources. "85 NEPA also orders the agencies to cooperate with the Council on Environmental Quality and international,
state, and local agencies in environmental planning. 86 Thus, full
compliance with NEPA procedures means not only complying with
the requirement for an environmental impact statement but also observing all of the other dictates of section 102. 87
77. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I)
(Supp. 1976).
78. These "action-forcing" procedures are designed to insure that the environmental protection policies of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970), are put into effect See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969); Robie, Recognition of
Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 7 NAT. REsoURcES LAw. 387,393 (1974).
79. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1974); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1971 ).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
82. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1132 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970).
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (E) (Supp. 1976).
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (F)-(I) (Supp. 1976).
81. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1132 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Even though NEPA establishes specific procedural requirements
and directs all federal agencies to carry out these section 102 requirements "to the fullest extent possible," 88 it does not provide
standards of judicial review of agency compliance with them. The
courts must therefore devise a standard of review that will give
meaning to this directive.
The courts seem to agree on a "rule of reason" standard for reviewing compliance with the NEPA procedures. 89 For example, in
preparing impact statements, agencies may be faced with the problem that not all information called for is known or presently discoverable. Under the rule of reason approach of the Scientists' Institute
court, 00 an agency would not be expected to be as detailed in its
discussion of remote effects as it is in its consideration of immediate
impacts. 91 Where environmental effects are unknown, it is the function of the impact statement to point out the lack of knowledge. 92
But an agency cannot "avoid drafting an impact statement simply because describing the environmental effects of and alternatives to particular agency action involves some degree of forecasting." 93 The
heart of agency responsibility under NEPA is to predict the environmental effects of a proposed action. 94
Although the courts purport to apply the same test of reasonableness, it is not at all clear that a uniform, well-defined standard exists.
Several courts have recognized that the standards for procedural review are still in the process of evolution and currently have more
of an ad hoc nature than may be desirable. 95 Consequently, any
88. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2) (D)-(I)
(Supp. 1976).
89. M.ost courts apply the reasonableness standard without indicating a statutory
source for the test. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers
of the United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1131 (5th Cir. 1974); National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974); Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commn.,
481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463
(5th Cir. 1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
834 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, some courts have relied on the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(B)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1970), which calls for courts
to declare unlawful agency actions taken "without observance of procedure required
by law," in applying the standard of reasonableness. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton,
509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 688 (9th
Cir. 1974). But see National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 995 (10th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
90. 481 F.2d at 1092.
91. See 481 F.2d at 1092; Applicability of NEPA to Long-Range Technology Development Programs: SIPI v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10100.
92. See 481 F.2d at 1092; Applicability of NEPA to Long-Range Technology Development Programs: SIPI v. AEC, supra note 15, at 10100.
93. 481 F.2d at 1092.
94. 481 F.2d at 1092.
95. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v. .Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1974). The Trout court relied on the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(B)(4), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1970), in applying
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discussion of the standard of review of procedural compliance must
remain somewhat general and episodic.
A good example of the ad hoc nature of procedural review is
Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 96 in which the court was faced with a
challenge to an impact statement for a dam and reservoir project.
The plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the statement failed to discuss
adequately many possible environmental consequences, possible
measures that could be taken to minimize the environmental harm,
and alternatives to the proposed dam and reservoir. 97
In response to the first allegation that certain environmental effects, such as the building of docks and summer homes along the
reservoir once it was completed, were not discussed, the court determined that while the statement would have been improved by a discussion of these consequences, the statement was nonetheless adequate for the purposes of the statute. 98 In deciding that there was
adequate discussion in the impact statement of possible measures to
mitigate environmental harm, 99 the court's examination was more
perfunctory. It confined itself merely to noting that mitigation
measures were discussed under eight separate headings, which, presumably, covered all possibilities. 100 Again, the court conceded that
the discussion, though adequate, could have been better. 101 Finally,
the court also found the discussion of alternatives to be adequate. 102
Taking the agency conclusions about the alternatives that were considered in the impact statement at face value, the court was primarily
a standard of reasonablenes.s. See note 89 supra. This statutory provision requires
courts to set aside agency actions taken "without observance of procedure required
by law." The failure of this statutory language to provide specific guidelines for reviewing agency actions was noted by the court:
The "without observance of procedure required by law" . . . standard, however, is less helpful in reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS than one might wish.
Its difficulty lies in the fact that the "procedure required by law" by which the
sufficiency of the EIS is measured consists substantially of judicial responses, to
specific allegations of insufficiency directed at specific impact statements prepared in connection with particular projects that were challenged in various federal courts. Neither NEPA nor the "Guidelines" of the Council on Environmental Quality set forth sufficiently comprehensive "procedures" to obviate the
necessity to resort to such judicial responses. The consequence has been and,
to a degree, is that the judicial review of the adequacy of an EIS employs standards fashioned to meet the needs of the particular case in which the standards
are applied. In due course the presence of a large volume of case law and the
principle of stare decisis will yield reasonably precise "procedural rules" by
which the adequacy of an EIS can be measured. That time, however, has not
arrived.
509 F.2d at 1282-83 (citations omitted).
96. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. See 509 F.2d at 1281.
98. 509 F.2d at 1283-84.
99. 509 F.2d at 1284.
100. 509 F.2d at 1284.
101. 509 F.2d at 1284.
102. 509 F.2d at 1286.
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interested in whether a sufficient range of alternatives had been discussed.103 The court did determine from the record that other alternatives, though not discussed in the impact statement, had been considered and rejected. 104
The response of the Trout Unlimited court to these specific allegations of statement inadequacy does not seem to follow a consistent
pattern. In the first instance, the court examined the record to see
whether the agency's conclusion that certain environmental consequences were remote possibilities was correct. 105 At the other extreme was the approach of the court in judging the adequacy of the
possible mitigation measures; it simply concluded from the form of
the discussion-that is, from the existence of eight topic headingsthat the discussion was adequate. 106 These examples show the ad
hoc nature of procedural review, which seems to be carried out on
an issue by issue basis.
Many of the circuits have come to hold that NEPA not only creates these procedural obligations but also creates substantive requirements.107 This, of course, is a departure from the early cases that
concluded there were only procedural duties108 and from the few
recent cases that continue to maintain that position. 109 According
to the courts that have found substantive duties, judicial review appropriately serves two purposes: to determine whether the decisionmaking procedures of NEPA have been used and to examine
whether the final agency decision is consistent with the environmental goals of the statute. llO
103. 509 F.2d at 1286.
104. 509 F.2d at 1286.
105. 509 F.2d at 1283-86.
106. 509 F.2d at 1284.
107. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486
F.2d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 66465 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1013-14 (E.D. Tenn.), application for stay denied, 414
U.S. 1036 (1973), ajfd., 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); Cohen & Warren, Judicial
Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 685 (1972); Yarrington, Judicial Review
of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the National
Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D. L. REv. 279 (1974); Robie, supra note 78, at 398412; cf. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The reviewing courts probably
cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits . . . unless it be shown that the
actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values").
108. See Yarrington, supra note 107, at 280-84.
109. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692 (9th Cir. 1974); Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973); National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971).
110. See, e.g., Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar,
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Although the statute contains no language explicitly creating substantive obligations, 111 the courts and commentators have based their
finding of substantive NEPA rights in part on the language and structure of the statute. One of the provisions in which the courts have
found substantive rights is section l0l(b).11 2 This section enumerates specific goals toward which the conduct of the agencies must
be directed as they seek to fulfill the general environmental protection policy of section l0l(a). 113 The opening paragraph of section
l0l(b) instructs the agencies to use "all practicable means" to
achieve these goals. The fact that the section l0l(b) goals are to
be accomplished "in order to carry out the policy" of the statute indicates that the creation of the goals itself was intended to be more
than a statement of policy.11 4
The second source of substantive obligations found in the language of the statute is section 102.115 This section specifically requires that "to the fullest ex:tent possible . . . the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies [of the statute]."116
Although section 102(2) sets forth only NEPA procedural requirements, it is clear that "[t]he procedures included in [section] 102
.of NEPA are not ends in themselves. "117 According to the Senate
Report, the purpose of the section 10(2) requirements is "to establish action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented."118
398 F. Supp. 685, 695 (E.D. Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976); Note, Judicial Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 38 Mo. L. RBV. 658, 661
(1973).
A third situation appropriate for judicial review arises when the method~ adopted
by an agency for preparation of the impact statement are challenged on the ground
that they do not comply with NEPA. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc.
v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
111. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the
United States Army, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark.), affd., 410 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1912), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Yarrington, supra note 107, at 294.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970); see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
114. See Yarrington, supra note 107, at 294.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I)
(Supp. 1976).
116. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(1) (1970).
117. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
118. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).
However, legislative history has also been used to support the position that NEPA
created only procedural requirements. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark.
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On the basis of this language, one court has concluded that
"[t]he unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require the agencies to consider and give effect to the environmental goals set forth in the Act,
not just to file detailed impact studies which will fill governmental
archives." 110 Because they have found substantive obligations and
because of the presumption of reviewability that applies to agency
actions, these courts conclude that they are obligated to enforce the
substantive duties created by NEPA. 120 _
This interpretation is certainly the better view. Those courts
that recognize only procedural duties seem to dismiss as mere rhetoric121 the entire section of the act thc!,t declares a national environmental policy. 122 It is unreasonable to maintain that Congress would
have enacted such a policy without establishing an effective means
of effectuating it. 123 Review of compliance with section 102 procedures alone will insure that environmental factors are brought to the
attention of the agencies, but will provide no guarantee that the
agencies actually will reach a result that is consistent with the goals of
NEPA. 124 Only enforcement of the substantive obligations will
force the agencies to achieve those statutory goals.
Although the substantive provisions of section 101(b)125 are
1971) ("The Act appears to reflect a compromise which, in the opinion of the Court,
falls short of creating the type of 'substantive rights' claimed by the plaintiffs. Apparently the sponsors could obtain agreement only upon an Act which declared the
national environmental policy. This represents a giant step, but just a step"); Yarrington, supra note 107, at 284.
119. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Army, 470 F.2d 289,297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
120. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the
United States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973);
Arkansas Community Organized for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 398 F. Supp. 685 (E.D.
Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v.
Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976).
121. See cases-cited note 109 supra.
122. 42 u.s.c. § 4331 (1970).
123. See Yarrington, supra note 107, at 294.
124. Cf. Note, supra note 110, at 664.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970):
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coordinate federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will per-
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framed in general language, courts have found the substantive obligations sufficiently definite to guide their review. 126 Subject to one
qualification, section 101 requires federal agencies to conduct their
activities in a way that will not unduly harm the environment. 127 In
addition, the statute suggests a nondegradation policy128 that would
require the government to forgo action that will reduce the current
level of environmental quality. In certain cases, agencies are not
only to avoid harming the environment but also are to improve and
enhance the quality of the environment. 129 Another concern of the
statute is the preservation of "diversity and variety of individual
choice."130
These substantive duties are explicitly qualified by one limitation. The government is to use "all practicable means consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy" to achieve the
section lOl(b) goals. 131 However, the fact that the provision requires reconciliation of environmental protection goals only with
those national policy considerations deemed essential indicates that
this qualification is not applicable in every situation. Unessential national policy considerations must yield to the environmental protection goals of NEPA. 132
To enforce these substantive obligations the courts have applied
a two-pronged standard of review based on the Administrative Procedure Act. This standard was explained by the Supreme Court in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 133 The court on review
must decide, first, whether the agency acted within the scope of its
authority and, second, whether the ultimate decision reached was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordmit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
126. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the
United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139 (5th Cir. 1974 ).
127. See Robie; supra note 78, at 390.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b)(3) (1970). See also F. ANDERSON, supra note 5,
at 265; Robie, supra note 78, at 390.
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4)-(6) (1970); Robie, supra note 78, at 390.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (4) (1970); see F. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 265.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
132. See Cohen & Warren, supra note 107, at 694; Robie, supra note 78, at 412
("this policy means that decisions must be made with the balance tipped in favor of
environmental protection unless such action is not consistent with other essential considerations of national policy") (emphasis original).
133. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Although Overton Park was not a NEPA case, it is
frequently referred to by courts for guidance on the standard of review in NEPA
cases. See Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 ( 4th Cir. 1973);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army,
470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973),
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ance with law." 134 To decide whether the agency acted within the
scope of its authority, the courts make a straightforward examination
of the agency's statutory mission. 135 In applying the less clear-cut
arbitrary and capricious test in cases under NEPA, however, the
courts must consider a number of factors. The inquiry focuses on
whether the balance of environmental costs and economic and other
benefits struck by the agency was justifiable.136 The courts must
determine whether clearly insufficient weight was given to environmental factors, 137 or whether the agency failed to consider all relevant factors, such as possible alternatives or mitigation measures. 138
In essence, the courts must decide whether the decision itself "represented a clear error in judgment." 139
As was true with procedural review, 140 the precise meaning of
the standard of review used for testing compliance with the substantive requirements is unclear. The arbitrary and capricious standard
is said to be a narrow one. 141 The courts echo the Supreme Court
statement in Overton Park that "[t]he court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency," 142 and, generally, the
courts have been quite restrained in reviewing agency actions on the
merits. 143 It seems the courts will not overturn an agency decision
unless it was clearly made in complete disregard of the environmental consequences or was completely unjustifiable. 144 That the
134. 401 U.S. at 415-16. This test derives from the Administrative Procedure
Act § lO(e) (B), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970). The "scope of authority" test arises
out of section 706(2)(B) & (C). The "arbitrary and capricious" test comes directly from section 706(2) (A).
135. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the
United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931
(1973 ).
136. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).
137. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th
Cir. 1972).
138. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 470 F.2d 289,300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
139. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
140. See text at notes 88-95 supra.
141. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1972).
142. 401 U.S. at 416. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club
v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).
143. See Note, supra note 76, at 746 (observing that apparently every review on
the merits of agency action for compliance with NEPA has permitted the agency to
proceed).
144. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 529 (1974).
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agency could have made a better decision is not sufficient to cause
the courts to overturn the decision.
For example, the district court in City of Romulus v. County of
Wayne, 145 applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in a substantive review, upheld a decision to add an additional runway to
Detroit's Metropolitan Airport. Among the allegations of the plaintiff were that the estimate of future air traffic demand was based
on erroneous assumptions, that a better indicator of future demand
existed, and that the computer predictions used were not by themselves accurate. 146 The court said that it could not consider these
claims because of the limited scope of its review. 147 Having found
a certain threshold level of rational decision-making, the court would
not take up the question of whether it would be possible to get better
information on which to base the decision. 148
Because of the limited nature of review for arbitrariness and capriciousness, it seems evident that in most cases the result would be
the same whether a court confined itself to demanding strict compliance with NEPA procedures or also reviewed the agency decision
for observance of substantive NEPA provisions. 149 However, extreme cases of environmental harm can arise in which the outcome
would hinge on whether or not substantive review was employed.
These are exactly the cases in which judicial intervention is most
needed to give effect to the environmental protection goals set by
NEPA. Even though some commentators have felt the need for the
application of a stricter standard of review, iGo substantive review
using an arbitrary and capricious test is itself an important safeguard
against violation of NEPA goals.
Whether this same kind of judicial review should be applied not
only to individual projects but to programs of which the projects are
a part is an issue that has yet to be addressed by the courts. However, such a review seems fully appropriate. This Note has established that only judicial review of compliance with the NEPA substantive provisions can insure that the environmental protection policy of the statute will be followed, particularly in those situations in
which the environment is most endangered. The same statutory interpretation that has led courts and commentators to approve substantive review of individual actions is applicable to programs. The
courts have concluded that a program is a major federal action sig145. 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
146. See 392 F. Supp. at 584, 587.
147. See 392 F. Supp. at 587.
148. See 392 F. Supp. at 587-89.
149. See Robie, supra note 78, at 410.
150. See Note, Tilting at the Environmental Windmill-The Quest for a Substantive Right to a Clean Environment, 9 SuFFOLX: L. REV. 1286 (1975); Robie, supra
note 78, at 436-37.
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nificantly affecting the quality of the environment, and that, therefore, NEPA applies as much to a program as to a particular project.151 Thus, programs should be subject to the requirements of the
substantive provisions.
Substantive review of both the program and the individual action
is necessary to carry out NEPA. Although program and site-specific
evaluations are required by the statute, the two types of impact statements serve different functions. 152 The program statement discusses the cumulative and synergistic effects of all the component
individual actions while the site-specific statement deals with the environmental impact questions that are peculiar to one project. Even
if all of the component actions individually have environmental effects that are acceptable in light of the NEPA substantive provisions,
the total impact of the program may not be acceptable.158 Therefore, if only the individual projects were subject to substantive judicial review, there would be no way to ensure that the program as
a whole satisfied the substantive requirements.
Conversely, the fact that NEPA substantive standards are met
by the program as a unit does not necessarily mean that each individual action also complies with the statute; the environmental deficiencies in a single project might not appear significant when considered
as part of a body that otherwise consists of environmentally sound
projects.154 Nonetheless, the statute requires agency compliance for
every individual action. Such compliance cannot be secured unless
each project is subject to substantive review. Because of the essentially different purposes achieved by substantive judicial review of
programs and of component projects, review of both program and
project statements is necessary to carry out the policy of NEPA.
ill. REMEDIBS FOR AGENCY NONCOMPLIANCE
Once a court has decided that a program as well as a site-specific
151. See text at notes 11-12 supra.
152. See text at notes 63-70 supra.
153. See text at note 14 supra.
154. For example, the Scientists' Institute court required the Atomic Energy
Commission to prepare a program statement for the development of the fast-breederreactor. See text at notes 7-12 supra. Presumably, if the AEC ever succeeds in making the fast-breeder-reactor suitable for commercial use, it will have to prepare impact
statements for each individual reactor. This would force the AEC to discuss alternatives to the proposed reactor and to specify precautions required to reduce as far as
possible the environmental damage from the individual reactor.
A second example involves the construction of a highway. A program statement
is necessary for the entire highway, yet impact statements are also required for individual projects such as a bridge or tunnel. In the case of a bridge, alternatives must
be considered and the benefit derived from moving traffic from one side of a river
to another must be balanced against the environmental damage resulting from construction of the bridge. Of course predictions as to the amount of traffic that the
bridge will carry would be based on the assumption that the entire highway has been
constructed.

'
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environmental evaluation is necessary and that the program compliance is deficient, the question of what remedy is most appropriate
under the policy of NEPA then arises. A common response of the
courts in dealing with inadequate site-specific impact statements has
been to enjoin further work on the project until there is compliance
with NEPA. 155 Injunctive relief also has been used when an agency
violated NEPA by not preparing a program impact statement. 1116 As
yet, no case has addressed the issue of remedies for a substantive
violation of NEPA.
This section of the Note first discusses when and to what extent
injunctive relief should be granted for any NEPA violation. A procedure for determining the scope of program injunctions is then suggested. Finally, the suggested procedure is applied to several examples. The immediate purpose of one type of injunctive relief,
the preliminary injunction, is to maintain the existing situation until
the dispute can be resolved at trial, 157 while that of the second type,
the permanent injunction,158 is to enforce the decision reached in
court. However, the broad purpose of both preliminary and permanent injunctions in environmental cases is to prevent any action
that would cause environmental damage from being taken in violation of NEPA.
A judicial finding of a NEPA violation does not automatically
result in the issuance of an injunction.159 In nonenvironmental
cases, courts have ,traditionally held that the granting of an injunction
,rests with the discretion of the trial court.16° Courts seem to exercise a similar degree of discretion in NEPA cases. 161
155. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1973); People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973); Stop H-3
Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972); Committee To Stop Route 7 v.
Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).
156. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v•.Brinegar, 381
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974).
151. See, e.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 595 (E.D.
Mich. 1975).
158. In the sense used he.re, a "permanent" injunction is not one that necessarily
enjoins an activity indefinitely. The activity may only be enjoined until a specific
condition is met, such as preparation of an impact statement or reconsideration of
a decision. A permanent injunction is granted here as final relief after the plaintiff
has prevailed on the merits at trial.
159. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584,
627 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Committee To Stop
Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972).
160. See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1965); Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964); Morris v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703,
709 (8th Cir. 1945).
161. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584,
627 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Committee To Stop
Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972).
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In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in
NEPA cases, the courts have generally relied on an analysis that is
similar to that used in nonenvironmental cases. 182 Traditionally, in
equity, a plaintiff's case must satisfy three basic requirements: It
must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits; it must
make a showing of irreparable harm; and it must establish that the
balance of equities favors the injunction. 183 These requirements are
somewhat modified when they are applied in environmental cases.
The first factor to be considered is whether the plaintiff has
shown a probability of success on the merits. 184 Before issuing a
preliminary injunction, the purpose of which is to preserve the status
quo, 165 the courts try to foresee the final resolution of the case. They
do this to avoid the inconvenience to the defendant that may result
from a court-ordered freezing of the situation carried out in favor
of an ultimately unsuccessful claimant.
A second factor courts consider before granting a preliminary injunction is whether the danger of irreparable harm exists. The traditional requirement of equity cases is that the plaintiff must show
that he himself will suffer such harm unless an injunction is
granted. 186 Although this language has been used in some NEPA
cases, 167 the courts have not actually applied the traditional irreparable injury test. 168 Instead, the word "irreparable" has been
given a "broad and expansive meaning." 169 Although the courts
say that they are evaluating the potential harm to the plaintiffs,
they are, in fact, concerned with the amount of harm to the environment that will result if no preliminary injunction is issued.
162. See City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594 (E.D.
Mich. 1975). However, one traditional element of equitable relief that is often ignored or assumed to be satisfied in the review of administrative action is the requirement that there be no adequate remedy at law. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Tmcr 444 (1959).
163. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Energy Office, 380 F. Supp. 560
(D.D.C. 1974), affd., 520 F.2d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
164. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975); City of Romulus
v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594-95 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Minnesota Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498
F.2d 1314.(Stb Cir. 1974).
165. See, e.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 595 (E.D.
Mich. 1975).
166. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Irie. v. Federal Energy Office, 380 F. Supp.
560 (D.D.C. 1974), affd., 520 F.2d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
167. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp.
584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
168. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 624
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381
F. Supp. 282, 283 (D.N.H. 1974).
169. See, e.g., Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381
F. Supp. 282, 283 (D.N.H. 1974).
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For example, in Steubing v. Brinegar,11° the court upheld the
grant of a preliminary injunction partly because the plaintiffs had
shown that the construction of the bridge in question would permanently scar one of New York State's most beautiful lakes. 171
Thus, even though the courts have used the language of the traditional equity formula in granting a preliminary injunction, their basic
purpose, once a probability of success on the merits is shown, is to
make certain that no significant damage to the environment occurs
before a final decision can be reached in the case. 172
While the courts have not applied the irreparable harm analysis
in the traditional sense, they generally do accede to the third requirement noted above-the traditional practice of balancing the interests
involved.173 The evaluation of the public interest is normally treated
as a separate factor in nonenvironmental cases. 174 In their formulation of the criteria for granting a preliminary injunction, the courts
deciding environmental cases have maintained the distinction between the public interest and the parties' interests.175 However, the
theoretical distinction tends to disappear when the formula is applied, since the balancing in reality becomes one of the public interests in continuing the activity against the public interest in environmental protection.
In any given case the public interest considerations may lead to
contradictory results. For example, in Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group v. Butz,1 16 the court observed that two separate
public interests had to be weighed in a suit to prevent logging in
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in Minnesota. Primary was the
interest, declared by Congress in the Wilderness Act,17 7 in preserv110. 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975).
171. 511 F.2d at 496. Consider also Society for Protection of New Hampshire
Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974), in which the court considered as irreparable injury to the plaintiffs the long-term effects on a "small, unique
area of incomparable beauty" of future automobile traffic on a proposed superhighway. 381 F. Supp. at 283. However, in Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group
v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974),
the court followed the traditional analysis of irreparable injury to the plaintiff.
112. Cf. City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 596 (E.D.
Mich. 1975).
173. See City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v, Brinegar, 381 F.
Supp. 282,283 (D.N.H. 1974).
114. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Energy Office, 380 F. Supp.
560 (D.D.C. 1974), affd., 520 F.2d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
115. See City of Ron:mlus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 594 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp, 610, 624
(D.D.C. 1974); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381
F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358
F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
176. 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
177. 16 u.s.c. § 1131-36 (1970).
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ing such areas in their primitive states. A-second public interest lay
in the economic value of the employment and income that would
be generated by the logging. The Minnesota court found the wilderness preservation interest to be overwhelming because it was an
interest declared by Congress and because the timber industry in
Minnesota had opportunities for logging elsewhere. 178
On the other hand, in The Committee for Nuclear Responsibility
v. Seeborg, 179 in which the plaintiff sought to halt the Project Cannikan nuclear test explosion, the court found that the public interest
required that no preliminary injunction be issued. Even though the
court thought that the failure to produce an impact statement was
probably a violation of NEPA, 180 it determined that the overriding
national security interest required that the test take place on schedule.1s1
There are a small number of cases in which the courts have deviated from the usual practice and refused to consider the equities involved when deciding whether to grant an injunction, either preliminary or permanent. 182 These cases have relied on an absolute rule
that courts should issue an injunction without looking to the traditional requirements of equitable relief when a federal statute has
been violated183 and when, in the case of a preliminary injunction,
a probability of success on the merits and a likelihood of irreparable
harm have also been shown. 184 These courts reason that if the policy behind an important federal statute is not being followed, an injunction should be granted to enforce that policy.185 Because
178. 358 F. Supp. at 626.
179. 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), application for injunction in aid of jurisdiction
denied, 404 U.S. 917 (1971).
180. See 463 F.2d at 797-98.
181. See 463 F.2d at 798. The government claimed that because of numerous
technical factors, conditions would not again be right for the test for at least one
year. Among the consequences of such a delay would be the disruption of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile program, which in tum, it was argued, would jeopardize
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
182. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974).
183. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 1971).
184. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610, 623
(D.D.C. 1974).
185. The courts in Lathan and Atchison relied on United States v. City and
County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). The City of San Francisco had violated federal law by selling power to a utility company instead of distributing it directly to the public. In prohibiting the city from continuing this practice, the Court
rejected the argument that a balancing of equities would weigh against an injunction:
"The equitable doctrines relied on do not militate against the capacity of a court of
equity as a proper forum in which to make a declared policy of Congress effective.
Injunction to prohibit continued . . . violation of that policy . . . is both appropriate
and necessary." 310 U.S. at 31.
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environmentally based decisions can have tremendous economic
consequences, this approach seems unjustifiably inflexible.186
In deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, the courts
generally consider some of the same factors that are used to determine whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate, but no definite
list of considerations is consistently used. The majority of courts engage in a balancing of interests that is similar to the process involved
in the consideration of a preliminary injunction. 187 For these courts,
the conclusion that NEPA has been violated does not automatically
result in the issuance of a permanent injunction. 188 Instead, they
generally adopt the position that if NEPA has been violated, there
is a presumption that injunctive relief should be granted. Unlike
the preliminary injunction situation where the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that an injunction is necessary, the burden here
is upon the government agency to persuade the court not to issue
an injunction. 189
The consideration of the public interest is one of the most important factors in the granting or denying of a permanent injunction.
The courts recognize that concern for the public interest in the preservation of the environment is proclaimed by the statute itself100 and
that it is this interest that plaintiffs may seek to protect.101 In competition with this interest may be other matters of public concern
such as traffic safety and the needs of the motoring public,102 or the
protection of jobs193 that may be furthered by a continuation of the
environmentally harmful activity. It is, of course, a difficult task to
186. See text at notes 215-23 infra.
187. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp.
584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Committee To Stop
Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn. 1972).
188. See Committee To Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn.
1972).
189. See, e.g., Committee To Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D.
Conn. 1972) ("But where an important provision of federal law has not been complied with, the burden should be upon those urging that noncompliance should be
excused").
190. See NEPA§ 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970): "The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person
has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."
191. See Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1250
( 10th Cir. 1973).
192. See Vermont Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Brinegar, 508 F.2d 927, 937
(2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Arkansas Community
Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 398 F. Supp. 685, 699 (E.D. Ark. 1975),
affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Coleman, 531
F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976).
193. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584,
626 (D. Minn. 1973), aftd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
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reconcile these conflicting public interests in any particular case.194
In addition to those elements that are common both to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, courts are willing to consider
numerous factors in deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction. These have included the stage of completion of the project, 195
the plaintiffs' delay in bringing suit, and the relative significance of
the environmental impact. 196
In several cases, courts have pointed out the need to consider
the likelihood that an agency action will actually be modified or
abandoned if all the procedural requirements of NEPA are met. 197
In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 198 for example, the plaintiff sought to enjoin certain logging operations until the
Forest Service prepared an environmental impact statement. In deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, the court said it was
necessary to determine the probability that the Forest Service could
be persuaded to ban all logging. 199 On the facts of this particular
case, the court decided that such a ban was likely. 200 It acknowledged, however, that if there were only a slight chance that the government would prohibit logging, an injunction would not be appropriate. 201
The fallacy of this approach is that until the necessary information is compiled by the agency, courts cannot predict the agency response; the court does not know what the new data will be. The
varieties of environmental effects and the possible alternatives to
mitigate these effects are too numerous for a court to engage in speculation about agency response.
Even if the agency has given some consideration to environmental factors without going through the impact statements process, it will
not have been confronted with all pertinent information. After all,
an essential purpose of the impact statement is to make public the
environmental effects and to invite public comment on the potential
consequences of a planned agency activity. 202 The plaintiff, of
course, cannot be expected to present all the objections that would
have been made by concerned members of the public had the agency
194. See text at notes 176-81 supra.
195. See Committee To Stop Route 7 v. Volpe; 346 F. Supp. 731, 738 (D. Conn.
1972).
196. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584,
627 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
197. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp.
584,625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
198. 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973), affd., 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
199. 358 F. Supp. at 625.
200. 358 F. Supp. at 625.
201. 358 F. Supp. at 625.
202. See note 62 supra & text at notes 61-62 supra.
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sought public comment. Without this public comment and the additional pressure that may be generated upon the agency to prepare
a thorough report, there is no way the court can be certain that all
relevant data is available. Hence, any prediction as to the probable
agency response will necessarily be defective.
An additional purpose of NEPA is to force agencies to integrate
environmental considerations into their decision-making processes.203 Enjoining a particular activity until all environmental factors are properly considered will not only compel agency compliance
in that particular case but will also place all agencies on notice that
the courts intend to enforce NEPA requirements effectively. The
threat of injunction may very well be the only judicial tool that is
capable of stimulating agencies to comply with this requirement in
every case and not just in those cases where the agency believes the
environmental impact will not alter its ultimate decision.
The decision to grant injunctive relief is only the first step, for
the court must also determine the scope of the injunction. 204 In the
case of individual projects, the courts have not limited themselves
to the granting or denying of a total injunction but instead have been
persuaded in particular cases to enjoin only parts of the project activity. 205 An example of such a partial injunction is Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar. 206 The suit was
brought by a group seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt
the construction of an interstate highway through the city of Little
Rock. The court found inadequate the discussion in the impact
statement of possible alternatives and modifications to the project.
It thereupon enjoined work on the highway east of a certain point
but allowed work on the road west of that point to proceed. 207 In
reaching this decision the court gave great weight to the fact that
a new hospital, one of only two in the city providing emergency service, was located along the route of the highway and that there was
a need for rapid access to this facility. 208 The court was also influenced by the need of the public for an expressway in the western
part of the city. 209
203. See text at notes 57-59 supra.
204. Of course, deciding to grant an injunction may very well involve some determination as to the scope of that injunction. These two steps may not always be distinct and the ability to frame an effective and reasonable injunction may be a factor
in deciding whether it should be granted.
205. See Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 398 F.
Supp. 685 (E.D. Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community Organization for
Reform Now v. Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976). Cf. Developments in the
Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L REV. 994, 1065 (1965).
206. 398 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Ark. 1975), affd. sub. nom. Arkansas Community
Organization for Reform Now v. Coleman, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976).
207. 398 F. Supp. at 699.
208. 398 F. Supp. at 699.
209. 398 F. Supp. at 699.
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Any judicial decision that allows continuation of a portion of a
project lacking an environmental impact statement warrants criticism; no agency should be permitted to proceed where environmental impacts are unknown. Yet it is likely that courts will continue
to allow portions of an activity to continue where the court perceives '
a high need for these portions to be completed and a low probability
of unacceptable environmental harm. These courts should at least
recognize the dangers inherent in this approach and allow exceptions
to an injunction only in exceptionally clear cases. Partial injunctive
relief is especially applicable to cases involving programs, which by
definition consist of many individual actions. The power of the
courts to enjoin all or part of a government action when a NEPA
violation is found would apply both to individual projects and to programs because a program is itself an action. In theory the courts
could use the same approach in granting equitable relief in program
cases as they use in cases involving individual projects. However,
whether a court should as a rule grant a total injunction against the
program or whether it should limit the scope of the injunction by a
consideration of the facts of a particular case depends upon the nature
of the violations the injunction is designed to remedy.
If the procedural requirements of NEPA have been satisfied and
if, after reviewing the merits of an agency action, the court concludes
that the program as proposed will violate the substantive requirements of NEPA, it must enjoin the entire program to prevent violations of the statute. In such a case it is the program itself, not the
procedures used in its planning, that is violative of NEPA. 210
The considerations involved are different when there is a violation of NEPA procedural requirements. An agency is required by
NEPA to obtain information on the environmental effects of and alternatives to a proposed action and to consider this information when
making a decision on that proposal. 211 When compliance with the
procedural requirements has been found wanting, no decision can
be made on whether the program itself violates the NEPA substantive standards. This second decision will come, if the issue is raised,
only after the program decision-making procedures have been followed and the necessary information to make such a decision is available.
Since the information needed to assess the environmental im210. Even if the entire program were enjoined, an agency would be free to propose certain program components as individual actions. However, the actions must
be completely independent of the enjoined program. The principles that determine
whether groups of actions require a program statement would be applied to determine
whether the individual actions constitute a new program or are to be deemed the same
program. See text at notes 7-56 supra.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D)-(I)
(Supp. 1976).
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pacts of the program is not available, there are several dangers in
allowing an agency to proceed with the proposed program. The
most important danger is that the agency may blindly engage in an
activity that causes substantial and irreparable damage to the environment. Even if such harm does not directly result, the agency
may become so committed to the program that it cannot modify or
abandon it even if it eventually discovers that the environmental
costs of proceeding are great. 212 Another hazard is that the continued government activity increases the agency's investment in the
program and thereby alters the balance of costs and benefits to favor
completion. 213 Because of these dangers some courts have enjoined
all component activities of a program found to be in violation of
NEPA procedural requirements. 214 These courts consider all activities that have as a primary purpose the advancement of the program
to be program components. 215 Such a total injunction would prevent
the government from making additional commitments that might
preclude a meaningful and unprejudiced agency decision in the future on the merits of the program.
Completely enjoining a large, complex program, however, is
likely to result in considerable expense to both government and the
private parties involved because of lost work time, increases in construction costs, and damages for various breaches of contract. Since
one of the factors that determines the desirability of an injunction
is the balance of interests among the public and private parties, an
increase in program expense will shift the balance toward the withholding of injunctive relief. However, two factors militate against
attaching too much weight to this increase. First, it is certainly correct that "[d]elay is a concomitant of the implementation of the
procedures prescribed by NEPA," 216 and, therefore, that increases
212. For example, in Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Commn., 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973 ), the court held that the env1ronmental effects of the entire breeder-reactor-program had to be considered at the
outset because, by the time the breeder-reactor-technology will have become operational, there would be a need for a new method of energy production, and because,
since only the breeder reactor will have been perfected, the government would have
no choice but to use it whatever the environmental costs.
213. See, e.g., Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381
'F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974); text at notes 18-23 supra,· cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974).
214. See, e.g., People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973); Stop H-3
Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972) (enjoining design and construction of a highway because even continuing the design work alone involved a significant expenditure of money that would increase the government stake in building the
highway as planned).
215. See People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 821 (D. Hawaii 1973); Stop H-3
Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (D. Hawaii 1972).
216. Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commn., 455 F.2d 412, 422
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. Supp. 282, 289 (D.N.H. 1974).
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in cost resulting from a delay necessary to achieve the goals of NEPA
should not dissuade a court from enjoining an activity to prevent environmental damage that may later prove too costly to correct. 217
Second, it must be remembered that the sole cause of the delay is
the agency failure to comply with the requirements of NEPA. As
was mentioned above, 218 prohibiting an agency from continuing an
activity in violation of NEPA may be the only judicial remedy that
will force agencies to consider adequately environmental impacts
during the initial decision-making process.
Nonetheless, the costs associated with a delay may be so substantial relative to the anticipated environmental harm that a complete
injunction is unwarranted. In such a case it would seem appropriate
for a court to exclude from the scope of the injunction any program
component that does not substantially compromise the environmental
safeguards of NEPA. The touchstone in determining which components of the program should be excluded is whether proceeding
with a component would likely preclude a meaningful decision on
implementation of the program itself after a full consideration of the
program environmental impact. 219 Even a component that in itself
causes no environmental harm may so shift the balance in favor of.
program completion that it should not be allowed to proceed. 220
An excellent example of the proper exclusion of a particular
project from a program injunction is Society for Protection of New
Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar. 221 In this case the court found a
violation of NEPA in the agency's failure to prepare a comprehensive impact statement for the entire proposed route of an interstate
highway. Included in the work planned for the immediate future
was the construction of twin bridges that were designed to replace
a single bridge that was in a dangerous state of disrepair and to expand its capacity to accommodate the planned highway. 222 The
court enjoined all work on the highway except the construction of
one of the planned twin bridges. 228
217. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Commn., 455 F.2d 412,
422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
218. See text at note 203 supra.
219. See People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811,821 (D. Hawaii 1973).
220. See People v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 821 (D. Hawaii 1973) ("Work allowed to proceed because it does not have a specific environmental impact would increase the government's 'stake' in the project and thereby influence the decision •
making process when it is time to reevaluate the project in light of the environmental
considerations"); Stop H-3 Assn. v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972).
221. 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 19}4).
222. 381 F. Supp. at 288.
223. 381 F. Supp. at 289-90.
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Because of the dangerous state of the existing bridge, the court
recognized that it was likely that a new bridge would be needed even
if the proposed interstate highway were never constructed. 224 Thus,
the government would not suffer any loss on account of the bridge
if the program were abandoned and hence, the bridge's construction
would not change the balance of the competing interests to favor
the completion of the program. This exception made by the New
Hampshire Forests court was an extremely narrow one. Although
the twin bridges were planned as a part of a program, one was allowed to be constructed because it was a necessary project when considered alone. The other, even though its direct environmental impact would apparently have been acceptable, was enjoined because
it was not necessary apart from the highway program and thereby
represented an additional commitment to the implementation of that
program.
Because the agency in New Hampshire Forests apparently argued for only a small number of exceptions to the injunction, 225 the
court was able to consider directly and to rule upon each request.
However, even a program such as the building of a highway involves
an infinite number of component parts that arguably could be continued without diminishing the protection of the environment. Had
the agency chosen to request exemption for a large number of individual actions, the hearing on the remedy would have been extremely time-consuming. Thus, if courts are efficiently to consider
possible exceptions to a program injunction, they need to use a procedure that removes the court from the process of considering every
program component for which an exemption is requested. 226
To accomplish an efficient review where many exceptions to the
injunction are sought, the court should enjoin all work on all program
components and order the agency involved to set up a review procedure to determine whether any particular component parts should
be allowed to proceed. Under such a review procedure, the agency
should first assess the environmental impact of the activity and make
a preliminary decision on whether it ought to proceed. The agency
should then inform the plaintiffs and other interested people of this
preliminary decision; these parties could respond to the agency,
which in turn might modify its preliminary decision as it deemed necessary.
224. 381 F. Supp. at 288-89.
225. See 381 F. Supp. at 288-89. The court also heard arguments, which it re•
jected, that the government be allowed to proceed with land acquisition.
226. Of course, if the agency wishes only to obtain an exemption for a small
number of activities, the court could easily decide the issue at trial. The procedure
this Note proposes would only be helpful in the case of a complex program in which
there were many activities that the agency desired to continue pending fu11 NEPA
compliance.
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If the plaintiffs or third parties227 are not satisfied that the f~al
agency decision was consonant with the purpose of the injunction,
they could resolve the matter in the district court, which would have
retained jurisdiction. However, even if there is no opposition to
the agency determination, the district court must still review the
agency decision on its merits. Only when the court has accepted
the decision that the continuation of a particular project will not
thwart the purposes of the injunction should the exception be allowed. 228
The injunction ought to set the standards by which the agency
is to make its decision. In deciding whether a particular action may
proceed without violating the purpose of the injunction, the agency
should consider the following factors:
(1) whether continuation of the individual activity will itself
result in a significant, adverse environmental impact; the nature and
extent of any impact; and whether the environmental damage could
be repaired at a reasonable cost if the project Were modified or
abandoned as a result of complete NEPA program comP.liance;
(2) whether continued work on the individual activity pending
NEPA compliance would physically foreclose subsequent adoption
of alternatives that might be dictated by the completed NEPA review;
(3) the effect o~ delay upon the varying public interests;229 and
(4) whether the additional commitment of resources might
preclude a meaningful decision reached on the NEPA review by
227. The district court may, in its discretion, allow third parties to intervene to
contest the agency decision. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).
228. The interim review process established by the Atomic Energy Commission
in response to Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), provides a model for the suggested
procedure. The AEC granted construction permits for nuclear reactors before the
enactment of NEPA. With the enactment of NEPA, the AEC began to conduct
NEPA reviews for nuclear reactors only in the event an operating license was requested. Calvert Clitfs' held this procedure inadequate under NEPA because construction on nuclear reactors continued without environmental consequences having
been considered. 449 F.2d at 1128-29. The AEC established an intei:im procedure
to determine whether construction permits should be suspended pending completion
of the required NEPA review. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, app. D, 1[ E (1972). For
a discussion of the substantive standards to be applied by the AEC in making this
determination, see note 230 infra & text at notes 229-30 infra.
Under the AEC procedure, within thirty days of the required publication in the
Federal Register of any AEC determination, any person other than the licensee could
request a hearing concerning the determination. Hearings would be held pursuant
to such requests at the discretion of the AEC. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, app. D,
1[ E.4 (1972). The procedure suggested by this Note would provide interested parties
an opportunity to comment without going through a formal process of requesting a
hearing, which the agency might refuse to grant. This change will both insure that
the agency takes account of objections to its decision and expedite the process by
making it less formal.
229. See text at notes 190-94 supra.
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shifting the balance among benefits, costs and environmental impacts. 2ao
The final consideration is the heart of the interim review process.
If the continuation of an individual activity will commit the agency
to the program or if it will preclude certain options so that the agency
is not as free to modify its plans as it was before the action was taken,
that action should be enjoined until there is compliance with the
NEPA procedures. As the following examples will demonstrate, the
number of activities that the review process should exempt will normally be small.
Had the interim review process been used in New Hampshire
Forests, 231 the result achieved in that case would not have been disturbed. The following conclusions are reached upon application of
the four criteria: (1) The court apparently was satisfied that the environmental impact caused by the construction of the single bridge
was within acceptable limits; however the environmental damage
would be permanent and not subject to repair if the highway were
modified or abandoned; (2) The building of this one bridge did not
physically prevent the government from rerouting the highway; (3)
Because the existing bridge was in a dangerous condition of disrepair, there was a current public need for a new bridge; (4) Because
of the public need for a new bridge, the single bridge would not
be wasted even if the highway program were abandoned, nor would
the construction shift the balance of interests in favor of the proposed
program. A consideration of these four factors shows that allowing
the construction of the bridge to proceed would not impair the enforcement of NEPA.
However, in New Hampshire Forests the government also asked
that it be permitted to acquire land for other parts of the highway
program even though it was enjoined from constructing the highway. 232 Application of the interim review standards in this case
leads to these conclusions: (1) The environmental impact of the purchases of the land would probably be slight and any impact caused
by mere government ownership could be reversed by the sale of the
230. The procedure established by the AEC for interim review of continued construction of nuclear reactors pending complete NEPA review, see note 228 supra, included the first three factors. See 10 C.F.R. Part SO, app. D, ,r E.2 (1972).
However, in approving the consideration of these three factors, the court in Coalition
for Safe Nuclear Pow~r v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 463 F.2d 954,
956 (D.C. Cir. 1972), added the final element, which it declared to be the most important. For similar standards for interim review of ABC projects made necessary
by NEPA, see 38 Fed. Reg. 19853, 19854 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 11326, 11327
(1974).
231. 381 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.H. 1974). For a discussion of the facts of this case,
see text at notes 221-25 supra. For the purposes of this example, it is necessary to
assume that a permanent rather than a preliminary injunction is being granted.
232. See 381 F. Supp. at 288-89.
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land if the government were willing to do so;233 (2) Because it would
be possible for the government to buy new land elsewhere for the
highway or to develop other means of transportation, acquiring the
land would not physically foreclose the adoption of alternatives that
might be dictated by the complete NEPA review; (3) The delay
might increase land costs because of inflation, but, since this effect
would be present in all aspects bf the program, there is no reason
to give special weight to the cost of inflation when considering land
acquisition; (4) The acquisition of land would affect the ultimate decision on· the program because the time and money invested by the
government would increase the cost of abandoning or modifying the
program. 234 Because the final decision to a certain extent depends
on a balancing of the costs and benefits of proceeding with the program, increasing the cost of abandonment or modification would
make proceeding with the program increasingly more attractive relative to any altemative. 285 Therefore, the government's land acquisition should not be exempted from the program injunction. This was
the result that the district court reached in the actual case. 236
233. There are numerous instances in which the purchase and resale of land could
cause environmental harm. For example, if the land were taken by condemnation
from private owners who were protecting its environmental quality and who, upon
modification of the highway program, sold to someone who would create an adverse
environmental impact, the net environmental effect would be significant. In New
Hampshire Forests, there was no indication from whom the land would be acquired.
234. See Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power v. United States Atomic Energy
Commn., 463 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
It might be argued that the government could resell the land if it decided to reroute the highway and, thus, could eliminate any cost incurred in abandoning the program due to prior land acquisition. However, it is not clear that the government
could always recover all of the money it had spent in acquiring the land. The value
of the land might drop when it is learned that the land is not needed for the highway.
Also, the cost of selecting the proper land and negotiating the sale would not be recoverable.
235. See Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power v. United States Atomic Energy
Commn., 463 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
236. 381 F. Supp. at 282.
In Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975), the court dealt with the effect
of allowing individual actions on future decisions concerning whole programs.
It ordered that the ultimate decision on whether to proceed with the program
must be made without regard for any commitments resulting from the individual action. The program in Cady consisted of a lease by the Crow Indians, approved by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, of Indian-owned mineral rights to nearly 31,000 acres
of land. No environmental impact statement was made before the making of the
lease. The individual action in Cady was the private lessee's mining plan for 770 acres
of the 31,000 acres covered by the lease, and the lessee's subsequent contracts agreeing to supply utilities with such large amounts of coal that fulfilling the contracts
would necessarily require mining a large portion of the 31,000 acres. The Bureau
of Indian affairs had issued an environmental impact statement concerning solely the
lessee's plan for 770 acres. When this statement was challenged, the Cady court ordered the government to prepare a program impact statement concerning the entire
lease of land. The order included the condition, however, that once the statement
was prepared, the government would have to make its decision as to approval of the
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The characteristic that distinguishes the land acquisition from the
building of the bridge in New Hampshire Forests is that the bridge
construction is severable from the total program while the land acquisition is not. In other words, the bridge would be constructed
even if there were no highway program, but there would be no land
acquisition in the absence of the program. In cases where the primary concern is to prevent additional government investments from
altering the balance of costs and benefits, those projects that can be
said to be severable from the program will be most properly exempted from the injunction by this process of interim review.
In other cases, however, even an action that is severable may
not qualify for an exemption. Consider, for example, a case in
which the component activities of the program are so geographically
related that only a limited number of projects can be put into effect
without creating an unacceptable environmental impact. 237 The
purpose of the program statement in such a case is to determine the
point at which the cumulative effects would become unacceptable
and to identify those projects that would most fully accomplish the
agency goal with the least damage to the environment. Because of
the geographical limit on the total number of projects, a commitment
to one project necessarily means that certain other projects may not
be undertaken. Without a comprehensive environmental evaluation, it is possible that the best projects, in terms of accomplishing
the agency goal with the least environmental cost, would not be included in the limited number allowable because another project was
begun first. Consequently, approval of a single activity would be
counter to the fourth criterion, which requires that a meaningful program decision not be precluded, and thus, no activity should be exempted from the program injunction.
Following the above procedure in determining the scope of injunctive relief will save considerable court time by shifting the reentire lease without regard for the commitments entered into by the lessee. 527 F.2d
at 798.
If the added investment created by work done before there is program compliance
is actually disregarded, the type of injunction issued in Cady would accomplish the
purpose of preserving the possibility of a meaningful decision on whether to continue
with the program. However, such disregard by the government might have been possible in Cady only because the investment to be disregarded was made by private parties, not by the government. In cases where the investment would be made by the
government, it seems unlikely that an agency could disregard the time and money
committed to the program prior to an environmental analysis. Presumably, no agency
would want to be accused by the public or by governmental budget administrators
of wasting money by investing in projects that later were abandoned.
237. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit believed that such a program existed in Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals by holding that
there was no program of geographically related projects. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96
s. Ct. 2718 (197.6) ..
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sponsibility for the initial decision on each action to the agency.
Moreover, because an agency need not present to the court arguments on each project it desires to be exempted, the agency does
not have to determine by the time of the trial activities with which
it might possibly want _to proceed should an injunction be granted.
As the need arises, the agency can begin the review process for any
particular program components.
Significantly, placing the responsibility on the agency for making
the initial determination on exempting components from the injunction is consistent with the scheme of the NEPA procedural requirements that places the initial responsibility for decision-making upon
the agency itself. 288 At the same time, the district court, by retaining jurisdiction, will be in a position to review directly the interim
agency determination. Thus, the use of this proposed procedure offers the same protection for environmental goals that are set forth
by NEPA itself.239
238. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(O)-(I)
(Supp. 1976).
239. The additional step of a master designated to approve or disapprove the
agency's preliminary decision could be incorporated into the proposed procedure.
However, both practical and statutory considerations militate against the use of a
master in this context. First, the addition of a master to the process would cause unnecessary delay and expense. See Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places
to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942). The master commonly must follow
normal adversary procedures and, therefore, his proceedings would tend to be a mere
duplication of a trial. See Developments, supra note 205, at 1067-68. Second, because the parties must be allowed the right to appeal the master's finding to the court,
which would retain jurisdiction, the master's decision would not be a final resolution
of any issues.
Finally, it is possible that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preclude the use
of a master to approve or disapprove preliminary agency decisions. Rule 53 (b)
states that "save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a
reference [to a master] shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional
circumstance requires it." This rule has been narrowly interpreted. See La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (court congestion, length of trial, and complexity of issues are not exceptional circumstances that warrant reference to a
master). Thus, rule 53 probably does not permit the use of a master in applying
the type of court injunction proposed by this Note. See Developments, supra note
205, at 1068.

